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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DAVID McCULLOUGH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20030185-CA

KEN FOX,

Priority No.

Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, from
which this appeal arises, is based on U.C.A. 78-3-4(1) (1953), (as amended).
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, U.C.A. 78-2-2(3)0) and Rule 3(a)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to U.C.A. Sec. 78-2-2(4) because the judgment appealed from has been transferred to the Utah
Court of Appeals for disposition.
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
Defendant's Motion for Stay of Execution against the Plaintiff pursuant to the
provisions of 78-23-13 U.C.A. (1953)(as amended), was denied by the Third District Court, Hon.

Sandra Peuler, Judge, presiding, on January 2, 2003. Defendant/Appellant appeals from that
Order and requests that this Court grant the injunction, and remand the matter to the lower court
for further proceedings to award damages for violation of the statute.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue I: Did the District Court commit reversible error by refusing to grant an order for a
stay of execution in favor of Defendant/Appellant and against the Plaintiff/Appellee pursuant to
the provisions of the Utah Exemptions Act, 78-23-13 U.C.A. (1953)(as amended) where the
Plaintiff-Creditor was executing upon Defendant-Debtor's personal injury proceeds which are
exempt pursuant to 78-23-5(ix) U.C.A. (1953) (as amended) contrary to the provisions of
Exemptions Act.
Standard of Review: The District Court's ruling on the effect of the Utah Exemptions Act
constitutes an interpretation of the statute, which is a question of law. The ruling of the District
Court will be reviewed for correctness. Trench Shoring Services v. Saratoga Springs
Development, 457 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah CA 2002);
Issue II: Did the Third District Court commit reversible error by refusing to exercise its
jurisdiction and apply the Utah Exemptions Act where both parties were domiciled in Utah, and
the judgment was entered in Utah, where the Plaintiff-Creditor-Appellee was proceeding to
execute upon Debtor's personal injury proceeds by way of an independent action brought in
Clark County, Nevada, where the proceeds of the personal injury settlement were located.
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Standard of Review: The District Court's ruling on the effect of the Utah Exemptions Act
constitutes an interpretation of the statute, which is a question of law. The ruling of the District
Court will be reviewed for correctness. Trench Shoring Services v. Saratoga Springs
Development, 457 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah CA 2002);

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Due Process Clause and Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution of the
United States is relevant to the determination of the choice of law issues in this appeal.
The following Utah statutes are relevant to the determination of the issues raised by this
appeal:
U.C.A. 78-23-5. Property exempt from execution.
(1) (a) An individual is entitled to exemption of the following property:
(i) a burial plot for the individual and his family;
(ii) health aids reasonably necessary to enable the individual or a dependent to work or
sustain health;
(iii) benefits the individual or his dependent have received or are entitled to receive
because of disability, illness, or unemployment from any source;
(iv) benefits paid or payable for medical, surgical, or hospital care to the extent they are
used by an individual or his dependent to pay for that care;
(v) veterans benefits;
(vi) money or property received, and rights to receive money or property for child
support;
(vii) one clothes washer and dryer, one refrigerator, one freezer, one stove, one
microwave oven, one sewing machine, all carpets in use, provisions sufficient for 12
months actually provided for individual or family use, all wearing apparel of every
individual and dependent, not including jewelry or furs, and all beds and bedding for
every individual or dependent;
(viii) works of art depicting the debtor or the debtor and his resident family, or produced
by the debtor or the debtor and his resident family, except works of art held by the debtor
as part of a trade or business;
(ix) proceeds of insurance, a judgment, or a settlement, or other rights accruing as a result
of bodily injury of the individual or of the wrongful death or bodily injury of another
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individual of whom the individual was or is a dependent to the extent that those proceeds
are compensatory;
(x) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), any money or other assets held for or payable
to the individual as a participant or beneficiary from or an interest of the individual as a
participant or beneficiary in a retirement plan or arrangement that is described in Section
401(a), 401(h), 401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 408A, 409, 414(d), or 414(e) of the United
States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended; and
(xi) the interest of or any money or other assets payable to an alternate payee under a
qualified domestic relations order as those terms are defined in Section 414(p) of the
United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
(b) The exemption granted by Subsection (l)(a)(x) does not apply to:
(i) an alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order, as those terms are
defined in Section 414(p) of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended; or
(ii) amounts contributed or benefits accrued by or on behalf of a debtor within one year
before the debtor files for bankruptcy.
(2) Exemptions under this section do not limit items which may be claimed as exempt
under Section 78-23-8.
78-23-13. Injunctive relief, damages, or both allowed against creditor to prevent
violation of chapter - Costs and attorney's fees.
An individual or the spouse or a dependent of the individual is entitled to injunctive
relief, damages, or both, against a creditor or other person to prevent or redress a
violation of this chapter. A court may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a
party entitled to injunctive relief or damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant's Motion for Stay of Execution against the Plaintiff pursuant to the provisions
of 78-23-13 U.C.A. (1953)(as amended), was denied by the Third District Court, Hon. Sandra
Peuler, Judge, presiding, on January 2, 2003. A copy of the Order is attached hereto and made a
part hereof.
Plaintiff obtained a Default Judgment against the Defendant dated April 11, 2001, and
filed on April 17, 2001, in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. R.15-16.
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On November 8, 2002, the Plaintiff, by and through Brent Larsen, Esq. of Las Vegas,
Nevada, filed a Complaint against Defendant in Clark County, Nevada, seeking "the appointment
of a receiver to take possession of the proceeds of a settlement of another lawsuit in favor of
defendant, which are in the hands of the defendant's Las Vegas, Nevada attorneys." R.23-25. The
plaintiffs Complaint alleges that he is entitled to "carry the Utah judgment into effect," and
refers specifically the Default Judgment rendered herein.
On November 12, 2002, plaintiff, by and through his attorney Brent Larsen, filed an
Application for Appointment of Receiver and obtained an Ex Parte Order for Appointment of
Receiver. R.30-31. The Affidavit from attorney Brent Larsen alleges, at paragraph 3, "I am
informed and believe that Mr. Fox is about to receive payment of a settlement in a personal
injury case (emphasis added) entitled Ken Fox v. Stratosphere Gaming Corp., Case No.
A3 93 903. The Affidavit further identified Mr. Fox's attorney of record, and requested that the
receiver be appointed to take possession of the sum of $36,500.00 that may come into the
possession of his attorneys. R. 33-35.
On December 11, 2002, Defendant Fox filed a Motion for Stay of Execution and
Memorandum in Support of the Motion in the Third District Court in the instant case. Plaintiff
filed a Memorandum in Opposition for Stay of Execution of Judgment on December 31, 2002.
R.17-21. The matter came on regularly for hearing on January 2, 2003, the Hon. Sandra Peuler,
Judge presiding.
After argument of counsel, the Court denied the Motion. An Order was signed and
entered on January 29, 2003. R.46-47. This Appeal was filed February 27,2003.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are uncontroverted.
1. On December 8, 2000, plaintiffs complaint was filed in this case in the Third District
Court in Salt Lake County. That complaint alleged that "Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah." R. 1.
2. Plaintiff obtained a judgment by default entered April 17, 2001, in the Third District
Court. R. 15-16.
3. In November 2002, when plaintiff filed his complaint in Nevada, Fox was a resident
of and was domiciled in the State of Utah, and plaintiff McCulloch was a resident of and
domiciled in the State of Utah.
4. The facts alleged in plaintiffs original lawsuit involved matters occurring during
October 1999, and all events alleged therein occurred in the State of Utah.
5. The money in the possession of defendant's Las Vegas attorneys was obtained
as a consequence of the settlement of the lawsuit between Appellant Fox and the Stratosphere in
Las Vegas, and consists entirely of proceeds from the settlement for damages for personal
injuries.
6. The proceeds of the personal injury settlement were in the hands of Mr. Fox's Las
Vegas attorneys and defendant Fox was entitled to receive those proceeds from his attorneys at
the time those attorneys were served with the plaintiffs Nevada action in November 2002.
7. The Nevada action was brought by the plaintiff to "carry the Judgment into effect", i.e.
the Utah judgment in this case.
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8. Under Utah law, personal injury proceeds are exempt property of a debtor.
9. Under Nevada law, personal injury proceeds are not exempt property.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Argument 1: The Utah Courts have jurisdiction to enforce the Utah Exemptions act where
the judgment was obtained in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and
where both parties are residents of Utah and domiciled in Utah. The Utah Court does not lack
subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin a Utah creditor from pursuing exempt property of the debtor
located in another jurisdiction. The mere fact that the exempt property of the Debtor is located in
Clark County, Nevada, does not divest the Utah Courts of jurisdiction.
Argument II: The Utah Courts should apply Utah substantive law pursuant to
constitutional choice of law principles, and not the substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction
where the property of the debtor is physically located. Utah is the state with the dominant
interest in the proceedings and should apply Utah law, and not Nevada law, regarding the
determination whether property of a debtor is exempt from execution by a general creditor. The
Utah Court of Appeals should reverse the decision of the lower court and enter its Order to
enforce the provisions of the Utah Exemptions Act and grant injunctive relief and damages in
favor of the Defendant/Appellant.
ARGUMENT I
THE UTAH COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE THE UTAH EXEMPTIONS ACT
AND GRANT AN INJUNCTION AND DAMAGES AGAINST A UTAH JUDGMENT
CREDITOR PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF 78-23-5(ix), U.C.A. AND 78-23-13,
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U.C.A. WHERE BOTH PARTIES ARE DOMICILED IN UTAH AND THE JUDGMENT IS A
UTAH JUDGMENT
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
party. The last clause of the open courts provision guarantees that an individual may "prosecute
or defend[ any civil action] before any tribunal in this State," so long as the individual is a party
to the suit. Utah Const, art. L § 11.
In Applied Medical Technologies, Inc., Plaintiff, v. Eames, 2002 Utah LEXIS 24,*;2002
UT 18; 44 P.3d 699;440 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 the court ruled on matters involving enforcement of
judgments in Utah. Rule 69(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, "A writ of
execution may be used to levy upon all of [a] judgment debtor's personal property and real
property which is not exempt from execution under state or federal law. [*7]" Utah R. Civ. P.
69(b). Accordingly, under rule 69(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a sheriff or constable,
pursuant to a writ of execution, may levy upon the nonexempt property and sell it at a sheriffs
sale.
The defendant/appellant appeals from the decision of the District Court denying his
request for injunctive relief to protect his exempt property. The plaintiff filed an action to
enforce his Utah judgment in the State of Nevada. Plaintiff asserted that the Utah court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction. The lower Court apparently believed that it should not tell a Nevada
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Court what to do in the pending action.

The lower court apparently believed that the matter

should be deferred to the discretion of the Nevada court, and on that ground refused to grant the
defendant the injunctive relief requested against the plaintiff. Tr. 10-11.
The proceeds of a personal injury settlement constitute exempt property and is not subject
to being attached by a general judgment creditor of the debtor. The proceeds of a personal injury
settlement are exempt property where the defendant is a resident and has his domicile in Utah.
The Utah Courts have jurisdiction to enforce the Utah exemptions statute where the parties are
all residents of Utah and are properly before the Court. Where a judgment creditor seeks to
attach the property of a debtor located in another state, the laws of Utah regarding exempt
property must be enforced by the Utah Court.
The plaintiff in the lower court did not dispute that the funds he was seeking to levy upon
constituted proceeds of a personal injury settlement in favor of the defendant. Neither did the
plaintiff dispute the fact that the defendant was a resident of Utah at the time of the service of the
complaint to enforce the Utah judgment in Nevada in November 2002. The plaintiff continues to
be a resident of Utah. All events which formed the factual basis for the plaintiffs lawsuit against
I
the defendant occurred in Utah. The plaintiff had no connection whatsoever with the Nevada
courts until he filed his action under Nevada law for the appointment of a receiver to take
possession of the proceeds of the defendant's personal injury settlement proceeds prior to the
same being disbursed to defendant by his Nevada attorneys.
Defendant seeks an Order of this Court enforcing his rights to have his exempt property
protected from a judgment creditor. Where both parties are residents of the State of Utah, and

9

the judgment is a Utah judgment, any post judgment actions are properly within the jurisdiction
of the Utah Courts.
Rule 69 (b) U. R.C.P. establishes the procedure to enforce a judgment through a writ of
execution. It specifically allows a creditor to levy upon a debtor's non-exempt property, and
provides for a hearing to determine the property of a debtor claimed as exempt.
Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental thereto.
(a) Availability of writ of execution. A writ of execution is available to a
judgment creditor to satisfy a judgment or other order requiring the delivery of
property or the payment of money by a judgment debtor.
(b) Property subject to execution. A writ of execution may be used to levy upon
all of the judgment debtor's personal property and real property which is not
exempt from execution under state or federal law.
The proceedings instituted by plaintiff in Nevada, although characterized as a Complaint
to appoint a receiver, has as its essential purpose an attempt to execute upon and seize the
personal property of defendant. The result will be essentially the same as if the plaintiff had
obtained a Writ of Execution in Utah. The actions of plaintiff in Nevada are, in effect, executing
upon a Utah judgment in foreign jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs position at the hearing on the Motion for Stay was set forth in his
Memorandum. He argues that "Even if the Utah courts did have jurisdiction, which they do not,
the Utah court would have 10 apply the law of Nevada, since Nevada is where the cause of action
and the proceeds are located. Nevada does not exempt actions for execution on personal injury
proceeds" R.40-42. In other words, the plaintiffs position is that because Fox's claim against the
Stratosphere occurred in Nevada and the money from that settlement was still in Las Vegas, that
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both the courts in Utah and Nevada would be required to apply Nevada law with respect to
determining exempt property.
The cases cited by plaintiff in the lower court do not support his position. Glezos v.
Frontier Investments, 896 P. 2d 1230 (Utah. App. 1995) has nothing to do with the facts of the
instant case. That case simply stands for the proposition that the Court of Appeals does not have
jurisdiction to consider an untimely filed cross-appeal under Utah R.App.P. 10(a). However, that
case is relevant to this appeal, in that it establishes that the provisions of Rule 10 are permissive,
and not mandatory, and therefore this Court has jurisdiction to hear this Motion.
The other two cases cited by the plaintiff in the lower court for the proposition that the
Utah court lacked subject matter jurisdiction are similarly not at all in point. As a matter of fact,
Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172 (Utah App. 1991) and Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717 (Utah
App. 1990) involved a determination of continuing jurisdiction for child custody purposes in
domestic cases, where there was a conflict between the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. Those decisions stand for the
proposition that the state where original child custody decree was entered had continuing
exclusive jurisdiction over custody issues, and held that a party may not voluntarily divest the
court of such jurisdiction, even though a party could waive personal jurisdiction and proceed to
litigate in a different state. The defendant herein submits that those cases similarly do not
support either the plaintiffs position or the decision of the lower Court. On the contrary, the
basic principles of continuing jurisdiction in child custody matters on the part of the original
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Court is similar to the instant case, in that this Court retains jurisdiction to decide issues arising
out of post-judgment remedies.
The plaintiffs claim in this case had no connection with Nevada. None of the parties
were Nevada residents at the time that the action accrued. None of the events alleged in
plaintiffs complaint occurred in Nevada. At the time the defendant made his motion for a stay
he was undisputedly a resident of Utah.
ARGUMENT II
UTAH COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE UTAH EXEMPTION ACT PURSUANT TO
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE OF LAW PRINCIPLES WHERE THE JUDGMENT WAS
ENTERED IN UTAH AND PARTIES ARE UTAH RESIDENTS NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT THE PROPERTY CLAIMED AS EXEMPT BY THE DEBTOR IS LOCATED
IN ANOTHER STATE
The United States Supreme Court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 101
S.Ct. 633, 66 L.Ed.2d 521 (1981) held that in order to comport to the standards of the full faith
and credit and due process clauses of the United State Constitution, that the substantive law of a
state must be applied in a constitutionally permissible manner. The state must have a significant
contact, or a significant aggregation of contacts, to create a state interest such that the choice of
that state's law is neither arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. There is nothing in the way of
significant contacts that would give this plaintiff the benefit of the Nevada exemption statutes
(which do not exempt personal injury proceeds) when the parties are both residents of Utah, and
the judgment of this plaintiff was obtained in the Courts of Utah.
The Court stated: "
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In deciding constitutional choice-of-law questions, whether under the Due Process
Clause or the Full Faith and Credit Clause, nlO this Court has traditionally
examined the contacts of the State, whose law was applied, with the parties and
with the occurrence or transaction giving rise to the litigation. See Clay II supra,
at 183. In order to ensure that the choice of law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair, see Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commfn,
294 U.S. 532, 542 (1935), the Court has invalidated the choice of law of a State
which has had no significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,
creating state interests, with the parties and the occurrence or transaction, nl 1.
The opinion further sets forth the public policy considerations involved in constitutional
choice of law issues.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is one of several provisions in the Federal
Constitution designed to transform the several States from independent
sovereignties into a single, unified Nation. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light
Co., 448 U.S. 261, 271-272 (1980) (plurality opinion); Milwaukee County v. M
E White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-277 (1935). n7 The Full Faith and Credit Clause
implements this design by directing that a State, when acting as the forum for
litigation having multistate aspects or implications, respect the legitimate interests
of other States and avoid infringement upon their sovereignty. The Clause does
not, however, rigidly require the forum State to apply foreign law whenever
another State has a valid interest in the litigation. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.
410, 424 (1979); Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S.
532, 546-548 (1935); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Common,
306 U.S. 493, 501-502 (1939). n8 On the contrary, in view of the fact that the
forum State is also a sovereign in [*38] its own right, in appropriate cases it may
attach paramount importance to its own legitimate interests. n9 Accordingly, the
fact that a choice-of-law decision may be unsound as a matter of conflicts law
does not necessarily implicate the federal concerns embodied in the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. Rather, in my opinion, the Clause should not invalidate a state
court's choice of forum law unless that choice threatens the federal interest in
national unit} by unjustifiably infringing upon the legitimate interests of another
State. nlO
The dissenting opinion, by Justice Powell states the constitutional principles as follows:
Both the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses ensure that the States do
not "reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
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U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (addressing Fourteenth Amendment limitation on state-court
jurisdiction). As the Court [*57] stated in Pacific Ins. Co., supra: "[The] full faith
and credit clause does not require one state to substitute for its own statute,
applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting statute of another state."
Id., at 502 (emphasis added). The State has a legitimate interest in applying a rule
of decision to the litigation only if the facts to which the rule will be applied have
created effects within the State, toward which the State's public policy is directed.
To assess the sufficiency of asserted contacts between the forum and the
litigation, the court must determine if the contacts form a reasonable link between
the litigation and a state policy. In short, examination of contacts addresses
whether "the state has an interest in the application of its policy in this instance."
Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
Judicial Function, in B. Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 188, 189
(1963) (Currie). If it does, the Constitution is satisfied.
The provisions of the Restatement of Law, (Second) Conflicts of Law Sec. 132 further
supports the position of appellant/defendant.
"The local law of the forum determines what property of a debtor within the state
is exempt from execution unless another state, by reason of such circumstances as
the domicile of the creditor and the debtor within its territory, has the dominant
interest in the question of exemption. In that event, the local law of the other state
will be applied."
This was ihe principal point argued by the defendant in the lower court. These principles
are established law, and have been adopted in many jurisdictions in the United States. The
debtor's exemptions should be determined pursuant to Utah law, and not Nevada law, because
both parties are residents of and domiciled in Utah and Utah is the state of dominant interest in
these proceedings. The local law of the state of dominant interest should be applied to determine
whether the property of the defendant is exempt from execution.
The lower Court denied the motion, and was of the opinion that this Court would be
somehow telling a Nevada Court what to do with a case filed in Nevada. Judge Peuler stated:
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Thank You. Here's my ruling. I'm going to deny the motion for stay
because while the Nevada Court may well decide that Utah law applies, I think it's
their call. The proceedings to attach the funds were filed in Nevada. The funds
are in Nevada, and I think that Court is the one that has to decide whether or not
the funds can be attached.
There are no funds here; they are located in a different state. I do think if I
said the funds are exempt I would be telling the Nevada Court what to do with
their lawsuit that's filed there. So—and that certainly I don't have jurisdiction to
do. So I'm going to deny the motion for stay because I believe that appropriately
has to be sought in Nevada." Tr. 10-11.
The decision of the lower Court appears to rest upon the concept that because the money
was not physically present in Utah, that the matter of granting a stay based upon a determination
of whether the attached property was exempt or not, and whether to apply Nevada or Utah law,
would be the decision up to a Nevada court. The lower Court essentially simply declined to
make a decision as to whether or not the personal injury proceeds were exempt, and denied the
debtor/defendant his statutory remedy. Appellant/defendant respectfully submits that this ruling
constitutes reversible error by the lower Court.
The defendant's position is that pursuant to the provisions of 78-23-13, U.C.A., he is
entitled to an order of this Court enjoining the plaintiff personally from a further violation of that
chapter. He argued that the Utah court has jurisdiction to enjoin the plaintiff, and thus there was
nothing of substance for the Nevada Court to decide, since the proceeding in Nevada is simply
an action to execute upon the Utah judgment. In other words, the relief that the defendant was
requesting was simply that the Utah Court protect his rights and enter an order preventing the
further violation of the Utah Exemptions Act by the plaintiff.
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Plaintiff and defendant are both domiciled in Utah. The full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution of the United States requires that the exemptions statute of Utah be applied.
Personal injury settlement proceeds are specifically exempt from execution by a general creditor.
It is well established that a debtor may seek an Injunction against a plaintiff to enjoin
proceedings in foreign jurisdictions. "An injunction may be used, where a creditor is within the
jurisdiction and amenable to the court's process, to restrain the creditor from seizing or selling
the exempt property in the foreign state or from proceeding to judgment and execution on an
assigned claim." See 31 Am. Jur. 2d . Exemptions. Sec. 336-337. See also cases collected at 6
A.L.R.2d at pp. 905-908 regarding the availability of an injunction for actions brought in another
state.
Generally injunctive relief provides the only adequate and complete protection for the
beneficiaries of the exemption laws. See Uniform Exemptions Act Sec. 17, citing 31 Am. Jur. 2d
Exemptions Sec 173-190 (1967). However, sometimes both an injunction and damages,
including costs and attorney fees will be appropriate.
The United States Bankruptcy Court in the District of Colorado considered the choice of
law principles in case involving similar facts. The Court held that under Colorado choice of law
rules, Colorado's rather than Iowa's exemption statute would be applied to determine whether
debtors residing in Colorado were entitled to exempt interest in annuity contract obtained by
debtor in Iowa as part of settlement of personal injury action; though creditor's judgment against
debtor was also obtained in Iowa, Colorado had dominant interest in seeing that its residents did
not become charge upon State. In re Pederson, 105 B.R. 622 (Bkrtcy.D.Colo.1989).
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The Court in Pederson. infra, found that Colorado has adopted the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws when resolving choice of law issues. The general rule as set out in Sec. 132
is that the law of the forum is controlling as to the exemption of property from execution unless
some other state has the dominant interest. The Court cited 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 522.06,
which states that the law of the debtor's domicile shall govern exemptions, even if the law of the
domicile is different from the law of the forum.
Since the forum and domicile of the debtor was Colorado, and the Court applied
Colorado law and ruled that the annuity obtained as a personal injury settlement was exempt.
That case states with particularity the public policy considerations upon which exemptions are
based, and one of the most important is that the debtor should not be left destitute by his
creditors to become a public charge. Thus, the residency of the debtor is one of the principal
reasons for the application of the exemption laws of a particular state where there is more than
one state with some contact with one or more of the parties.
Exemption rights in bankruptcy are determined as of the time of the bankruptcy filing.
11 U.S.C. Sec 522(b)(2)(A). The state of residency and domicile of the debtor determines what
property is exempt, where the state has opted out of the amended federal bankruptcy exemptions
statute, (which both Utah and Nevada have done.) Utah law determines what property is exempt
for a Utah resident. The appellant/defendant is undisputedly a Utah resident for purposes of
bankruptcy jurisdiction. If the courts of Utah fail to enforce its exemption statute, the obvious
recourse for such debtors is to seek relief in the United States Bankruptcy Court. Under
bankruptcy practice, the Bankruptcy court would enforce the automatic stay against any state
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court proceedings by this creditor in the courts of Utah or Nevada, or any other state where there
is property of the debtor.
In Colorado, proceeds of personal injury settlements are exempt. In this case, should it
make a difference for purpose of determining exemptions policy that a Utah debtor may have his
proceeds attached by a Utah creditor in Las Vegas but not in Denver. Or, what would be the
effect if the Utah debtor had Utah counsel in an out-of-state action for personal injuries and the
settlement money was paid to his counsel in Utah. The actual physical location of personal
injury settlement proceeds should not be the principal factor in determining whether the funds
are exempt from creditors, and the decision of the lower court to that effect is clearly contrary to
law.
Utah law is very specific. Pursuant to the provisions of 78-23-5(ix) U.C.A. (1953) (as
amended) property is exempt where such property constitutes the "proceeds of insurance, a
judgment, or a settlement, or other rights accruing as a result of bodily injury of the
individual

to the extent that those proceeds are compensatory." It is not disputed that the

money that the plaintiff seeks to attach is a personal injury settlement. The plaintiff, through the
affidavit of his attorney acknowledges that the defendant's case against the Stratosphere was for
"personal injuries." The settlement funds in the present possession of Mr. Fox's attorneys of
record are entirely compensatory, and are for the bodily injury suffered by Mr. Fox. as a
consequence of the negligence of the Stratosphere.
Utah Exemptions Act specifically protects the proceeds of a "settlement for bodily
injury" from execution by a general creditor. The plaintiff is a general creditor, and he had no
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connection whatsoever with the defendant's lawsuit in Nevada against the Stratosphere. He was
not involved in that case in any way. His claims against this defendant related exclusively to
events that had taken place in Utah. The file and record in this case do not reflect that the
plaintiff had ever made an effort to execute on his Utah judgment until November 2002.
The plaintiffs actions in commencing an action in Nevada for the Appointment of a
Receiver is in violation of the Utah Exemptions Act. He is attempting to seize and levy on the
exempt property of the debtor. The plaintiffs argument that because the money is in the hands
of debtor's Nevada attorneys, and not physically present in the State of Utah, that the Utah Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore may not grant the defendant the relief he seeks is
not supported by existing legislation or relevant case law. In addition, his position is simply bad
public policy. Defendant respectfully submits that under choice of law principles the Utah
Exemption law applies and should be appropriately enforced by this Court.
In Homeside Lending, Inc v. Miller 2001 UT App 247;31 P.3d 607;428 Utah
Adv. Rep. 6;2001 Utah App. LEXIS 64 this court dealt with issues arising under the Utah
Exemptions Act. As to the issues and standard of review, the court stated:
In the present matter, the parties have stipulated that there are no disputed
questions of fact. Accordingly, we afford the trial [*6] court's legal conclusions
no particular deference, but review them for correctness. See Lefavi v. Bertoch,
2000 UT App 5, PPM-15, 994 P.2d 817; Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P.2d 713, 714 (Utah
CtApp. 1988).
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, defendant respectfully submits that the defendant is entitled to the relief
as follows:
1. That this Court determine that the proceeds of the personal injury settlement in the
present possession of defendant's Las Vegas attorneys constitutes property of the debtor which is
exempt from execution pursuant to Utah law;
2. That the Court enforce the provisions of the Utah Exemptions Act and issue its Order
enjoining this Plaintiff personally, including his attorneys, assigns or agents, from proceeding in
Nevada or elsewhere to attempt execution upon the aforesaid exempt property of the defendant;
3. For his costs of court, damages according to proof, reasonable attorney fees, and for
such other and further relief as may appear to the court to be just and equitable in the premises.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated this^T^day of August 2003.
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D. RUSSELL
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of
Defendant/Appellant was served upon the plaintiff by mailing said copy, postage prepaid, and
addressed to plaintiffs attorney of record, J. Kent Holland, Anderson & Holland, 623 East First
South, P. O. Box 11643, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643 t h i s ^ d a y of August 2003.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

J. Kent Holland #1520
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
Attorney foi Plaintiff
623 East First South
PO Box 11643
Salt Lake Ot), Utah 84147-0643
Telephone (SOI)- 363-9345

CXputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE STATL OF UTAH

DAVID McCOLLOUGH
Plaintiff
vs
KEN FOX
Defendant

;
;I
;

ORDER

)
)
;

Civil No 00909958
Judge Sandu \ Peul

The above-entitled matter came on loi heaung on Dclendani s Motioi foi Stay of
Execution of Judgment on January 2, 2003 befoie the Honoi able Sandra N Pw alei Plaintiff
appeared through his counsel J Kent Holland Defendant appealed through h counsel John
D Russell Oral argument was heard and following said aigument the Court \ iled as
follows
IT IS HEREBY-BORDERED Defend mt's Motion In* Va\ o! E\ccuiic ^ of
Judgment is denied
DATED this 7°[

day of Januai\ 2003

fonc iable S mdia N Peul
Thud Disinci C outt Juclec^i

JOHN D. RUSSELL
Attorney for Defendant
10 West Broadway, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-0312
FAX: (801) 363-8438
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID McCULLOUGH,
Plaintiff,

)
AFFIDAVIT OF KEN FOX

vs.

)
)

KEN FOX,

)

Civil No. 000909958
Judge: Sandra N. Peuler

Defendant.

)

STATE OF UTAH

)
ss.
County of Salt Lake )
COMES Now Ken Fox, who, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says
as follows:
1. My name is Ken Fox.
2. I am the defendant in the above-captioned matter.
3. That I have read and am familiar with the matters set forth in my Motion for
Stay of Execution of Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Motion.
4. The factual matters set forth in the Motion and Memoramdum are true and
correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

5. That the money that the plaintiff is seeking to obtain by his lawsuit filed in the
District Court of Clark County, Nevada, constitutes the proceeds of a personal injury
settlement in my favor in the matter captioned Ken Fox v. Stratosphere Gaming Corp.,
Case No A393903. The settlement remains in the possession of my attorney of record in
that case, Eckley M. Keach of Las Vegas, Nevada.
6. I understand that the proceeds of a personal injury settlement are exempt
property pursuant to the Utah exemption statute, 78-23-5 U.C.A. (1953) (as amended).
7. I am presently a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. I was a resident
of Utah at all times material to the allegations contained in the Complaint of the Plaintiff
and the Default Judgment he obtained. The Plaintiff is a resident of Utah, and has been at
all times material to this case.
8. I was not a resident of Nevada when the injuries occurred at the Stratosphere,
nor was I a resident of Nevada when the plaintiff filed his Complaint against me in their
CaseNo.A458944.
9. I hereby state that the proceeds of the settlement are for bodily injury that I
sustained as a result of being stabbed in the back at the Stratosphere in 1998.
Further your affiant sayeth not.
Dated this j day of May 2003.
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VERIFICATION
Before me personally appeared Ken Fox, who, being first duly sworn upon oath
deposes and says that he has read and is familiar with the matters set forth in the
foregoing Affidavit of Ken Fox, and that the matters set forth therein are true and correct
to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

Dated this D day of May 2003.
PAMELA H-b£UT

,

Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake Cit>l, Utah
My Commission Expires:

^Nlo^
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12/23/2882

14:31

7823835960

ECKLEV M KEACH CHTD

FAtat

Q2/k)t>

AFFIDAVIT OF ECKLEY M, KEACH

1
2

STATE OF NEVADA

3

COUNTY OF CLARK

)
) ss.
)

4

ECKLEY M. KEACH, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
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1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada and in that regard

<5 represented defendant Ken Fox in a personal injury matter in the Eighth Judicial District Court in
7

Clark County, Nevada styled Ken Fox v. Stratosphere Qaming Coin., a Nevada corporation d/b/a
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Stratosphere Tower Hotel & Casino; Jorge Delcaimen Cruz, an individual, ct aL Case No. A393903.
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2.

Attached hereto is plaintiff Ken Fox's settlement statement to The Honorable Jack
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Lehman, District Court Judge of Clark County, Nevada, dated October 28,2002. This statement was
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submitted to Judge Lehman for purposes of a settlement conference on October 31,2002 and detai Is
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Mn Fox's bodily injury claims as a result of an incident at the Stratosphere Hotel in Las Vegas on
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June 8,1998. Mr. Fox's personal injury action resolved as a result of the settlement conference.
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FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

15
16

M. KEACH
17
18

Subscribed and sworn to before me
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thiS^

day of December, 2002

20
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Nota*y£ublic' V
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NOTARY PUBLIC
KAnENA.MUUUtfmN
"" 5 ? * T £ O f NEVADA

23
24
25
26
27
28

rsxifcTrorecuwic
MY Mpponrmorr otpmi
OCTOBER 10,2006

